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The sixth state reform has  just made the Regions  competent as regards the taxation of mortgage loans  for one's  'own and sole' 
home. Commonly referred to as  the ‘housing bonus’, this  system benefits  many taxpayers. It is nevertheless the object of criticism. 
This  tax incentive – whose overall value amounts to tens of thousands of euros per person – is granted without income-related 
conditions. The richest also benefit, when they 
would have become homeowners without this help. 
At the same time, the disadvantaged households 
scarcely make use of it, simply because property 
prices are too prohibitive for them. This  tax incen-
tive raises prices  by stimulating the demand, so 
that in the end it benefits  sellers rather than buyers. 
Finally, the housing bonus (less advantageous  by 
half in this  case)  discriminates against those who 
live alone. That just shows  that, especially in a con-
text of budgetary restrictions, it is  important for the 
Regions to reconfigure the housing bonus, in par-
ticular in a more social sense. In future, this  advan-
tage could also be linked to healthiness or energy 
requirements, or be saved for first-time buyers.
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1. Since 1 January 2005,1  an individual who purchases  his  or her 
‘own and sole’ home (in the sense that the buyer must live in it and not 
own another property)  and who finances  it with a mortgage of a mini-
mum duration of ten years, is  entitled to deduct the interest, capital 
depreciations  and other insurance premiums  paid in connection with 
his or her loan from his  or her income in his or her tax declaration,2 for 
the full duration of the credit. Commonly referred to as the ‘housing 
bonus’, this  system has  replaced another tax incentive – referred to as 
‘home purchase savings’ – which was similar overall (although slightly 
less advantageous for the taxpayer).
2. In concrete terms, the financial weight of the bonus is  far from be-
ing insignificant for the taxpayer. With an average annual value of 1,348 
euros in Brussels  (compared to 1,395 euros in Flanders and 1,310 
euros in Wallonia), the aid is  applicable each tax year, for the full dura-
tion of the loan. Given that the average duration of a  mortgage is 
twenty years, the tax advantage must be multiplied by twenty (thus  ex-
ceeding a total of 25,000 euros, and 50,000 in the case of a couple). 
3. The housing bonus gives  rise to discussion for the many reasons 
discussed below. On 1 July 2014, thanks  to the sixth state reform,3 the 
Regions became competent in this  matter, which until then had fallen 
within the remit of the federal authority. A true revolution is  occurring. 
The object of this  article is  to provide a few suggestions  for reorienta-
tion (which may be drawn from our critical remarks in particular) with 
respect to a tax incentive which is  supported by citizens  as well as  be-
ing the subject of debate.
1. Criticisms 
1.1. Aid which essentially benefits those who do not need it 
4. Firstly, the tax advantage is granted without income-related condi-
tions; the richest (and the poorest) are entitled to receive it. This gener-
ous  universal approach results  in the traditional deadweight effect: 
households  which are not really in need benefit essentially from this 
measure, when they undoubtedly would have become homeowners 
without the help of the public authorities. The support from the state is 
therefore not a deciding factor – or scarcely – in the purchase of a 
home by high and average income households. Furthermore, the finan-
cial advantage becomes concrete for the person concerned more or 
less  only two years after the transaction, as taxes  are paid with such a 
gap in time. And, as  an additional illustration (of how the tax advantage 
is  not taken into account when a possible purchase is being consid-
ered), the banks  themselves  do not consider the bonus while evaluating 
the prospective borrower’s ability to pay as well as his or her solvency.
1.2. Aid which remains inaccessible to those who need it
5. This  deadweight effect (those who would have gone ahead with a 
purchase regardless of the support receive public money) would not be 
too problematic if, at the same time, there was  an equal distribution of 
beneficiaries among the different social classes. This is not the case: 
the higher the income, the more this  tool is used. Thus, no less  than 
50% of the budget is used up by the two highest income deciles,4 
while the five lowest deciles account for 15%. The disadvantaged 
households  therefore make little use of the scheme (scarcely 1% for the 
lowest income decile compared to 58%  for the highest) [Valenduc, 
2008], with good reason, given the rise in property prices, in particular 
in Brussels. Since the proclaimed objective of the legislator (in adopting 
1
1 Programme act of 27 December 2004, M.B., 31 December 2004, err. 18 January 2005.
2 For the 2014 tax year, the deduction amounts to 2,260 euros maximum, increased by 750 euros in the first ten tax periods and by 80 euros when the taxpayer has three dependent chil-
dren on 1 January of the year following the year the mortgage was taken out.
3 Art. 5/5, §4 and 81quater of the special law of 16 January 1989 on the financing of the Communities and Regions, M.B., 17 January 1989, inserted by articles 11 and 75 of the special 
law of 6 January 2014 amending the financing of the Communities and Regions, widening the tax autonomy of the regions and financing new competences, M.B., 31 January 2014.
4 The last decile (of ten) includes 10% of the total tax declarations of people with the highest revenue, and the first decile, 10% with the lowest revenue. 
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the housing bonus) consisted in making home ownership for all a wide-
spread model, one may question the effectiveness of the mechanism, 
as entire sections  of the population are not able to become homeown-
ers. It would scarcely be an overstatement to say that the measure 
serves  to keep one’s  home rather than to purchase it. Those who do 
not have the means  to ‘pre-finance’ the tax advantage (which takes  
effect two years later), find it very difficult to become homeowners. 
6. To conclude this point, the number of homeowners  has neverthe-
less  risen in Belgium over the past few decades. However, in its  official 
notice on the regionalisation of the housing bonus, the Vlaamse Woon-
raad declares that there is  ‘no certitude’ regarding a correlation be-
tween this evolution and the establishment of tax incentives  in favour of 
homeowners, basing itself on international studies which claim that 
there is ‘no link’ [Vlaamse Woonraad, 2012]. Other factors must instead 
be highlighted, such as  the improvement in the standard of living and 
the decline in interest rates. And, in any event, the most recent statis-
tics  point to a slight backward surge in the number of homeowners  in 
the Brussels  Region – which is  a first – (39% in 2011, compared to 
43% one decade ago),5 which is  additional proof if ever there was  that 
the bonus lacks effectiveness, despite its high cost for the state.
1.3. Greater aid for those with a high income (which clashes 
head-on with the principle of progressive tax)
7. Not only do the most well-to-do represent the majority – by far – of 
those who take advantage of the bonus  but, what is more, the public 
cost is  highest for them. Why? This is  simply because the deduction is 
based on the marginal tax rate. This deserves  an explanation. The de-
duction is applied before the tax calculation, and consists  in deducting 
certain tax deductible expenditure from the taxpayer’s tax base. This 
subtraction takes  place in the highest income bracket for the taxpayer, 
i.e. that which is  subject to the highest tax rate in a  progressive tax sys-
tem such as ours  (with a maximum of 50% – considering that the lower 
income brackets are taxed at 45%, 40%, 30% and 25%). Conse-
quently, this  approach is  advantageous for taxpayers with a high in-
come, as  their non tax expenditure is  greater than that of the modest 
taxpayer, even though the original deducted amount is identical. Cor-
relatively, from the point of view of the state, the tax on the amount 
subtracted this  way would be considerable (as  the rate of personal in-
come tax increases in proportion to financial resources); in any case, 
more than it would be for lower-income taxpayers. 
8. From this  perspective, the deduction may unquestionably be con-
sidered ‘regressive’, i.e. the tax advantage increases in proportion to 
the wealth of the person concerned. Our tax system is  supposed to be 
based on the principle of progressive tax, which, in theory, does not 
allow a taxpayer with a high income to benefit from a tax incentive 
which is proportionately greater than that for a less wealthy citizen. 
1.4. Aid which puts single people at a disadvantage
9. Another distinctive feature of the housing bonus is that the tax 
advantage benefits  both members  of the household. This  raises  a (le-
gitimate) question regarding equal treatment, in as  much as  the federal 
tax support proves to be greater when the borrower household is made 
up of two people rather than one, even when the property purchased 
and the loan taken out is perfectly identical. Yet, single people generally 
have a  lower income than couples  do. The financial effort required in 
order to purchase a home is therefore proportionately greater.6 Would it 
not have been more appropriate to increase the aid for single people, 
rather than do the opposite? Let us mention in any event that, contrary 
to popular belief, a  relatively high number of people who live alone take 
out a  mortgage (almost a third of loans 7), which provides an accurate 
measure of the issue.
2
5 Comparison of the 2001 census with the 2011 census carried out by S.P.F. Economie.
6 For example, the maximum authorised deduction for a couple with three dependent children amounts to 6,180 euros (for the 2014 tax year); this amount is reduced by half (3,090 euros) 
for a single parent household with three dependent children.
7 Exactly 29% [Huyghebaert, 2012]. 
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1.5. Inequitable aid
10. In order to counterbalance the system of deduction based on the 
marginal rate (which benefits  those with the highest income, as men-
tioned above), the maximum amount of expenditure to subtract from 
one’s  income could instead decrease in inverse proportion; in other 
words, the well-to-do household would not be authorised to deduct the 
same amount as  its  more modest counterpart. This is  far from being 
the case however, as  the maximum is  identical for everyone, regardless 
of the resources of those concerned.8  From that perspective, the tax-
payer in a state of financial precariousness  does not receive more – 
from a  tax perspective – than the others; not to mention those who are 
too poor to pay taxes and, for this  reason, are excluded de facto from 
the pecuniary advantage (assuming that they were able to convince a 
bank to lend them the money to purchase a dwelling in the first place). 
11. In terms  of social justice, this characteristic of the housing bonus 
is  at the very least subject to debate. In addition to being ineffective, it 
also proves  to be inequitable. In a word, the fact that the system bene-
fits de facto the most well-to-do households must be examined by the 
public authorities: is this an optimum use of public money? 
1.6. Aid which has the pernicious (and extremely counter-
productive) effect of inflating property prices, and therefore 
mainly benefits sellers
12. An iron law of the market economy is  that the offer price is closely 
dependent on the demand. A person who sells  a dwelling is  usually 
aware of the tax gift which the prospective buyer will receive, and may 
therefore be tempted to include it in the requested price; while the 
buyer (who benefits  from the tax credit only two years  later) is not al-
ways aware of this, the seller seems  to be better informed. The ques-
tion may therefore be raised as to whether the housing bonus has had 
the (added) (pernicious) effect of raising property prices. Far from being 
iconoclastic, this question is based on an academic study [Huyghe-
baert, 2012], which succeeded in identifying – amid the traditional infla-
tionary factors  (such as the demographic boom) – the influence of the 
housing bonus. The study concluded that this additional purchasing 
power is  indeed reflected in the prices  [along the same lines, Albrecht 
and Van Hoofstat, 2012]. Property sellers  quickly adapted by taking this 
into account, perhaps  not in the years  which immediately followed the 
establishment of the housing bonus, but soon thereafter. This  observa-
tion was  officially confirmed by the Vlaamse Woonraad, which believes 
that, ‘as  additional revenue, the bonus  “led to an increase in prices” in 
as much as  “there is a growing demand, whereas  the housing offer is 
not increasing proportionally’ (and that, generally speaking, the housing 
market in Belgium proves  to be ‘inflexible’)  [Vlaamse Woonraad, 2012]. 
Even when compared with other European countries, the rate at which 
the number of dwellings increases in Belgium ‘has not been so slow 
since 1980’ [OECD, 2013]. A shocking conclusion may be drawn: the 
tax credit essentially benefits sellers.
13. Plainly, the bonus  supports  the demand. As mentioned above, the 
bonus is  not enough of an incentive – and not well known enough – to 
convince disadvantaged households  to ‘take the leap’ (and purchase a 
home), as  they would have to pre-finance the aid, which is  financially 
impossible for them. But for middle class  households  which are not 
indifferent to this help from the state (and perhaps  better informed), this 
knock-on effect exists  to a  certain extent. And, as  a sign of the concern 
felt by some citizens regarding the plans to revise the bonus (down-
wards), the number of mortgage requests exploded in September 2014 
(+85%  compared to September 2013, according to Febelfin); in reality, 
people are in a  hurry to purchase a home while there is  still time, as it 
were, which of course has made prices leap (+13% in the same pe-
riod).
14. In a word, the financial advantage which is  supposed to benefit 
the buyer proves  to be nonexistent, as  it has  been ‘swallowed’ (entirely) 
by the higher prices; there is  therefore no tax gift. Or rather, it does  not 
favour the presumed recipient, as the bonus  ends  up in the pocket of 
the seller – the final beneficiary of the advantage – instead of that of the 
buyer. From this perspective, the housing bonus  is  also ineffective and 
even counter-productive.
3
8 Voy. supra footnote n°2.
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1.7. Aid which is a heavy burden for the public budget
15. As mentioned above, the housing bonus  is  granted without 
income-related conditions  (a maximum, for example). Naturally, this  
absence of social selectivity – combined with a non modulation of the 
maximum deductible expenditure – has  a cost, and it is  substantial. 
Thus, in 2011, the 2005 housing bonus alone represented a loss  of 
earnings  for the tax authorities of 1.227 billion euros  for the entire coun-
try, distributed as follows: 828  million euros for Flanders, 330 million 
euros for Wallonia  and 69 million euros for Brussels.9  And if (all of) the 
expenditure related to the tax regime before 2005 – which many 
households  still benefit from – is  added, the total cost is  close to 2.2 
billion euros  each year, i.e. three times  more than the combined re-
gional budgets  assigned specifically to housing [Monnier and Zimmer, 
2008].
16. Let us  examine this revealing budgetary matter more deeply. The 
federal housing bonus is far from being the only aid granted to home-
owners. For example, the Brussels  Region offers  a range of support for 
home ownership: loans with preferential interest rates  granted by the 
housing fund (on average 2% lower than the rates  of the traditional 
banking market), housing production subsidised by Citydev (formerly 
SDRB) for middle income households (which only have to pay approxi-
mately two thirds of the market value of the property), possibility to de-
duct part of the registration fees 10 (favour extended later11), exemption 
from inheritance tax on the family dwelling for the surviving spouse 
(thus avoiding having to sell the property in order to pay the inheritance 
tax),12 ‘community land trusts’ financing, etc. And, not to mention that 
those who purchase Citydev housing have recently been able to benefit 
from a reduced VAT rate (6%).13 
17. In total (federal tax deduction and regional support combined), 
close to 219 million euros  have been devoted to homeowners in Brus-
sels. Compared to the meagre amounts devoted to aid for tenants (in 
the private market in Brussels), this  figure makes one wonder. Not in-
cluding social housing,14  less than 12 million euros  have been ear-
marked by the Brussels  Region for tenants (essentially via  ‘move/
settling in/rent’ benefits  intended to compensate for the additional cost 
involved in moving from substandard housing to decent quality hous-
ing, and ‘rent’ benefits  intended to lower the rent item in the household 
budget, independently of a move), which represents  scarcely 5%  of 
overall expenditure in favour of owners. The weakness  of this  public 
financial contribution is shocking in itself, and appears  to be out of step 
with reality, as  tenants  represent the majority in the Brussels-Capital 
Region (44.75%, compared to 41.45%  of owners  and 13.8% of ten-
ants in publicly managed or social housing). 
18. Furthermore, these ownership support schemes are usually ac-
cumulative. The following illustration is  telling in this  respect [Mathieu, 
2014]. For the household (with 42,000 euros in annual income, for ex-
ample) which purchases a three-bedroom Citydev flat sold for 260,000 
euros (benefiting from reduced VAT), obtains  a  30-year loan with prefer-
4
9 At the end of 2013, the amount for Brussels reached 101 million.
10 Art. 46bis of the Code of Registration Duties, Mortgage Duties and Court Fees, introduced by article 2 of the order of the Council of the Brussels-Capital Region of 20 December 2002, 
M.B., 31 December 2002.
11 Art. 2, 1°, of the order of the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region of 10 February 2006, M.B., 15 February 2006.
12 Order of 30 January 2014 amending the Code on inheritance tax, M.B., 6 March 2014.
13 Art. XXXVI of annexe A of the royal decree of 20 July 1970 establishing the rate of the value added tax and determining the distribution of goods and services according to these rates, 
M.B., 31 July 1970 as modified by article 3 of the royal decree of 21 December 2013, M.B., 31 December 2013.
14 This sector nevertheless includes 38,000 households, despite the fact that it represents only 8% of the housing stock in Brussels. If the other publicly managed or social housing (such 
as the social housing agencies) is added, this sector received no less than 78.2% of Brussels' budget pertaining to housing in 2014, i.e. 202 million euros. 
Nicolas BERNARD, Valérie LEMAIRE, 
The regionalisation of the ‘housing bonus’: 
towards a policy adapted to the Brussels context?, 
Brussels Studies, Number 83,
January 26th 2015, www.brusselsstudies.be
ential interest rates  from the housing fund and benefits from the federal 
tax credit, the total amount of public assistance amounts  to 240,240 
euros,15 i.e. almost as much as the initial amount.
19. One last paradox must be pointed out. Despite its  more than sub-
stantial cost, the housing bonus has  until now not been the subject of 
much debate, and has  been questioned even less. Why? Because it 
involves a tax deduction which, as such, proves to be not very legible/
visible or financially objectifiable by the citizen. It is  true that the loss of 
earnings  for the state is generally more difficult to understand than the 
gross  disbursement (the allowance, for example). Furthermore, there is 
no need to seek further for the reason why, generally speaking, the tax 
rebate receives so much support from politicians; it is  true that the 
process is easy (although not painless for public finances).
1.8. A ‘push towards debt’?
20. Another question must be raised: by granting the tax advantage to 
those who take out a  mortgage to purchase a  home, are taxpayers  
encouraged to get into debt? On reflection, is this  system profitable 
mainly for banks  and other credit institutions? The number of outstand-
ing mortgages is very significant in Belgium, representing 188  billion 
euros at the end of 2013  (having furthermore tripled over the past 14 
years). Of the 28  member states of the European Union, only 5 coun-
tries have a  mortgage debt per inhabitant higher than Belgium. Let us 
also mention that as  the current tax incentive scheme is  not limited in 
time (a mortgage loan may have a duration of 20 or 30 years or more, 
and public support continues), it encourages buyers to get into debt in 
the long term, which has the pernicious secondary effect of raising 
prices [Bigot and Hoibian, 2009].
21. The European Commission has  already had the occasion to criti-
cise Belgian policy in this area, considering that the favourable tax 
treatment of mortgage loans constitutes  one of the factors  which con-
tributes to the household debt and to an overinvestment in property 
(with the risk of a  speculative bubble) [European Commission, 2012]. 
Some of our neighbours  have modified their legislation recently in order 
to reduce the incentive (sometimes in considerable proportions) or have 
simply abolished it,16 not to mention the (many) countries  which do not 
offer tax advantages in view of favouring home ownership.17 
1.9. Aid which may be received an unlimited number of times 
(and which is therefore not intended for first-time buyers)
22. If the housing bonus  must be maintained, it may therefore be ap-
propriate – with respect to the criticism that the aid benefits  those who 
do not need it – to grant it only to first-time buyers. It is  indeed crucial 
to help those who purchase property for the first time to get a foot in 
the door, especially when the people concerned are young. The result 
would be that people would benefit from the tax advantage only once. 
This  is  currently not the case: as  long as a person has  sold his  or her 
first property, he or she may benefit again from the tax advantage for 
his or her next purchase, and so on. Let us  mention that the possibility 
to benefit several times from public home ownership support also ex-
ists  with respect to registration fees: in order to benefit from the allow-
ance, the buyer cannot be the full owner of another immovable prop-
erty intended partly or fully as a dwelling, on the date of the purchase 
5
15 i.e. 163,000 euros for the Citydev grant (in reality, the housing cost the public authorities 423,000 euros but, as explained, the buyer pays only two thirds of it), 34,800 euros for the VAT 
reduction, 77,230 euros for the differential of interest saved thanks to the loan from the housing fund, and 49,480 euros for the federal tax deduction.
16 In France, for example, the interest on mortgage loans is now deductible only if the loan was taken out before 1 January 2011. Ireland is in the process of gradually eliminating the de-
ductibility of interest, which will disappear totally in 2017; Portugal is also part of this gradual elimination trend. Finland decided to decrease the proportion of deductible mortgage interest, 
which dropped from 85% in 2012 to 80% in 2013 and 75% in 2014. Spain totally repealed (after several successive reforms) deductibility for loans taken out as of 1 January 2013.
17 Germany, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and United Kingdom.
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agreement. But nothing prevents  him or her from selling and buying a 
home one after another.18
23. In this  respect, let us  mention that, unlike the majority of its neigh-
bours, Belgium decided that capital gains  from the disposal of property 
would be exempt from tax when it is  the main residence of the seller or 
when it is  acquired through inheritance (and, in other cases, if the resale 
takes place five years after the initial purchase). And, furthermore, the 
possible tax (at a rate of 16.5%) only applies  to the gain, and not to the 
total amount of the transaction. When one considers the bonus taken 
by the property prices  in Brussels for example, with a  fourfold increase 
in values  in scarcely two decades [Kahane, Staelens and Franck, 
2012], one becomes aware of the profit net of tax19  which may be 
raked in thanks to this type of operation. 
24. In any case, one may wonder if our current tax regime – based on 
the housing bonus  – encourages  speculation, as owners  are in no way 
discouraged financially from purchasing property in order to sell it at 
times of rising prices, for example. This phenomenon would contribute 
to the sharp rise in prices, thus confirming the above hypothesis.
1.10. Various
25. Various criticisms  and suggestions, perhaps more peripheral, may 
be made regarding the housing bonus. 
26. Firstly, the tax advantage could have been focused more on the 
primary market (new housing), for the express purpose of stimulating 
the housing offer and construction. However, this idea has  never been 
pursued by our rulers. 
27. The French model of tax support for the rented sector has  not 
been followed either. South of the border, a plethora of tax incentives 
have been thought up to the benefit of those who purchase property 
and then let it (Robien, Borloo, Scellier, Duflot, etc. laws); sometimes 
with pernicious  effects, the housing which is built (in an exclusively fi-
nancial logic) does  not always meet existing needs. The opposite is true 
in Belgium: in the case of letting, the cadastral income is  increased by 
40%. 
28. Furthermore, the authorities  assure that they are fighting against 
urban sprawl and promote the densification of existing cores, for rea-
sons  related to energy, the environment, mobility and landscape con-
servation. If they were consistent, they would therefore increase the tax 
credit in favour of households which have chosen to live in urban cen-
tres. They have not done so. 
29. Another aspect raises questions. Even if the deduction concerns a 
person's  ‘own and sole’ home, nothing prevents  owners  from letting 
the dwelling later and from continuing to benefit from the tax advan-
tage, as long as they lived in the dwelling on 31 December of the year 
during which they took out a loan (and that they have not acquired an-
other property). If they decide to let the housing, those who have re-
ceived the tax support from the state are in no way obliged to prove in 
return any moderation in setting the rent. The aid received may in a 
sense be converted into purely private profits; owners  are authorised to 
make the most profit from a  dwelling purchased (in part) with public 
money.
30. Finally, at a time when energy savings  are supposed to be pro-
moted, it is  surprising to see this  tax advantage (the vast majority of 
which is used in the secondary market, i.e. the existing housing stock, 
instead of the primary market, which concerns  new housing) granted 
independently of any commitment to upgrade energy efficiency. At the 
very least, a  modulation of the aid (according to efforts in this  respect) 
should be considered. 
6
18 Article 46bis of the Code of Registration Duties, Mortgage Duties and Court Fees.
19 Unless it involves an activity of a speculative nature (as opposed to the ‘normal management of personal assets consisting of property […]’, according to the terms of art. 90, 1°, of the 
Code on income tax). For a recent illustration, voy. Cass., 21 November 2013, Fiscologue, 2013, n°1365, p. 11.
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2. Institutional evolution
2.1. From deduction to reduction
31. The housing bonus no longer exists since 1 January 2015. For 
technical reasons  beyond the framework of this article, the federated 
entities are legally prevented from granting tax deductions. Subse-
quently, the federal authorities  have resolved, before passing the re-
sponsibility on to the Regions, to transform the deduction into tax re-
duction (of 45%), from this date. This  solution, however, will only apply 
(by default) if the Regions replace their own regime with it.
32. What makes the tax reduction different from the deduction? The 
latter applies  only when the amount of tax has  been determined, after it 
has  been calculated. It is  deducted from the tax owed and, in concrete 
terms, is a fraction – identical for all the taxpayers  – applied to the total 
taxation (45% in Brussels  – Wallonia and Flanders  decided recently to 
lower the threshold to 40%, from 1 January 2015 for the former), re-
gardless of the level of income of the person concerned. For this  rea-
son, the reduction may be seen as more egalitarian than the deduction 
(at the marginal rate) as, in relative terms, the tax bonus received by the 
rich is  not greater. In this  way, fair taxation is  somewhat restored. Nev-
ertheless, this  solution is not (always) in keeping with the principle of 
progressive tax.
33. It is  of course far too early to make any scientific assessment of 
the reduction mechanism, which has just come into effect. Based on 
criticisms pertaining to the deduction, our suggestions for reorientation 
may prove to be successful in the new institutional situation. However, 
it is surprising that the Brussels  Region has not taken the opportunity to 
at least reduce the federal rate of tax reduction (as  its counterparts  in 
the north and the south have done), which would have contributed al-
ready to combating the deadweight effect. And, if there is  a  modifica-
tion (an evaluation is  under way), it will not be implemented before 
2017, which seems late.
2.2. Is Brussels in a budgetary trap?
34. As mentioned above, the cost of the bonus is  a heavy burden. 
This  is  not all: if the federal state's  policy is  maintained in full by the 
Brussels  Region, these already significant amounts  may be 2.5 times 
greater in 15 years. Based on the 2005 regime, the amount of 185 mil-
lion euros  – and even 274 million euros  – is expected to be reached by 
2027 [Rassemblement bruxellois  pour le droit à l’habitat, 2014]. The 
latest up-to-date forecasts (May 2014) for expenditure related to prop-
erty tax deductions  in Brussels substantiate this  concern, as  a doubling 
of the cost is  expected between the 2008  and 2019 tax years  (from 
79.63 to 154.75 million euros, housing and remainder of the previous 
system combined) [SPF Finances, 2014]. And, at national level, this  
expenditure should reach 4.9 billion euros  (2.7 billion for the 2005 re-
gime alone).20 As they are based on the current burden and not on fu-
ture costs, the means  allocated by the federal state to finance the new 
competence are very far from being sufficient. 
35. How can this upward trend be explained? The method of calcula-
tion provided for in the special finances act should be advantageous  for 
Brussels, in as  much as  it is based on the personal income tax contri-
bution rather than on the usage ratio of the bonus. In effect, these 
budgetary resources  will be apportioned among the Regions  according 
to the distribution key for personal income tax;21 and, as the share of 
this  tax represented by Brussels  amounts to close to 8.4% (for 2015), 
for a usage rate of the tax deduction stagnating at 6.7%, the system 
devised by the finances  act is  unquestionably favourable to the 
Brussels-Capital Region.
36. Two elements of nuance should however be mentioned. Firstly, the 
budget was  adopted according to calculation methods (deduction at 
7
20 Cf. Vlaams Parlement, Commissie voor Algemeen Beleid, Financiën en Begroting 
Vergadering, session of 24 January 2012, Doc. 61 (2011-2012).
21 Art. 35decies of the special law of 16 January 1989 on the financing of the Communities and Regions, M.B., 17 January 1989, inserted by article 32 of the special law of 6 January 2014 
amending the financing of the Communities and Regions, widening the tax autonomy of the regions and financing new competences, M.B., 31 January 2014. 
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the marginal rate) which are obsolete; they prove to be less  costly for 
the Brussels Region than the new ones (as, in the Brussels  Region, the 
marginal average taxation rate remains  far below 45%  – the rate for the 
tax reductions); in other words, those who are currently taxed at a  rate 
lower than 45% – and they represent the vast majority in Brussels – 
gain from this, to the detriment of public finances. And, more funda-
mentally, the tax expenditure is  destined to increase exponentially each 
year until the bonus  reaches  its  cruising speed (only in 2024), as  the 
outlay is  cumulative (including both the new borrowers  and the contin-
ued payment of the tax advantage to the old ones). This  is all very logi-
cal: each beneficiary enjoys the tax advantage for the full duration of 
their loan and, each year, new households  take out a loan. While in 
2005, tax expenditure was limited to advantages granted to first-time 
borrowers, from 2006, the public authorities  have had to take respon-
sibility for the housing bonus  for borrowers whose contract was signed 
during the current year, as well as  continue to pay the advantage to 
those whose loan was taken out the year before, and so on. A ‘plateau’ 
will be reached only in 2024, when the newcomers will be compen-
sated by the outgoing taxpayers  (who will have paid off their loans  and, 
therefore, will no longer benefit from the tax advantage).
37. Plainly, in the coming years, the amounts  allocated to the feder-
ated entities will not correspond to the actual costs  which they will have 
to bear, with the Brussels Region in the lead. However, if the latter re-
ceives  a  provisional amount of approximately 120 million euros  for 2015 
– which may seem to be little – a final benchmark amount will be calcu-
lated later, in the light of a report drafted by the Court of Auditors (which 
will take into consideration the actual tax expenditure – with no 
changes  in policy – for this tax year); this  report will be ready by 31 De-
cember 2016 at the latest, based on information provided for that pur-
pose by 31 October 2016 at the latest.
38. The Brussels Region could have controlled the budgetary ‘slip’ to 
a certain extent, for example by deciding to lower the tax reduction rate 
to 40% (as  seen in Wallonia  and Flanders); the average inhabitant of 
Brussels  would have continued to gain (with respect to the previous  
regime), with the average marginal tax rate remaining below the 40% 
threshold over the years. However, the authorities decided not to make 
any changes  to the system inherited from the federal state (in any case, 
not before 2017). 
3. Suggestions for reorientation
3.1. Abolition, adaptation or prolongation?
39. There are obviously many avenues for reflection for the future re-
gional legislator. In theory, the authorities have a  lot of freedom in the 
transposition. How can they be guided along the way? 
40. Generally speaking, moderation is  recommended. Firstly, an aboli-
tion (or a  very radical reduction) of the housing bonus  would result in a 
more or less  sharp downturn in the housing market as a  whole.22 The 
issue is controversial, however; in this respect, the Dutch counter-
example keeps  returning like a sort of refrain, but in the light of the ex-
periences  of other European countries, some people feel that this  con-
cern ‘must not be exaggerated’ [De Decker, 2014]. In any case, if an 
option of this  type must be chosen, the authorities should at least en-
sure that the effect of the measure is  spread over time, to achieve a 
progressive ‘phasing out’. And perhaps  more targeted alternatives 
should be implemented at the same time to continue to support home 
ownership, such as  granting a reduced VAT rate according to the price 
of the dwelling (for sale or to let) and not the status  of the operator, 
lowering registration fees  (or refocusing the allowance on low-income 
households), etc.
41. In all likelihood, however, the bonus  will be maintained (rather than 
eliminated)  for political and symbolic reasons. At the very least, the form 
of this tax advantage, its  amount and the conditions for granting it 
should be reconsidered, in order to keep pace with the social changes 
observed since the implementation of this  measure, which reinforces 
the need for security through home ownership. 
8
22 Of the order of 25%, assures economist Julien Manceaux on behalf of the bank ING (L'Écho, 25 June 2014, p. 26).
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42. In this  respect, there are a number of suggestions  for reorientation 
related to the criticisms  expressed above. The aid could be increased 
to the benefit of low-income households (and even exclude the house-
holds  with the highest income), the tax advantage could be reinforced 
to the benefit of single people, it could be granted only to first-time 
buyers, it could be linked to environmental, energy or rent require-
ments, etc. From our perspective, reasoned conditionality would in no 
way lessen the impact of this tremendous tool for social advancement 
(in theory); it must simply reflect the current political priorities  more ac-
curately. 
43. Another solution would be to simply prolong the regime ‘by de-
fault’ advocated by the federal state (just before regionalisation), i.e. the 
uniform tax reduction of 45%. However, this  approach proves  to be 
more expensive (than the previous deduction system) for the Brussels 
Region as the average marginal tax rate is  far from reaching the thresh-
old of 45% in Brussels, as  mentioned above. It is  possible, however, to 
modulate this  reduction rate according to the level of income, which 
would result in a more ‘progressive’ mechanism.
44. In any event, it seems important that the possible amended re-
gime should only apply to new property transactions. The basic pre-
cepts  of legal security prohibit the modification of the rules  of the game 
under way for all those who have taken steps  to purchase a  property 
with the current housing bonus integrated in their financial calculations.
45. In this  respect, let us  mention that many Belgians  (a third of them) 
currently hold at least one mortgage.23 On another level, while no less 
than 594,400 property tax deductions  were made in Flanders  in 2011 
(i.e. 15.4%  of the total number of declarations 24) and 250,200 in Wallo-
nia (11.5%), this figure drops to 51,200 in Brussels  (7.2%); this differ-
ence must be put into perspective, with a much smaller proportion of 
homeowners in the Brussels  Region (39%) than in the two other Re-
gions (66% in Wallonia and 71%  in Flanders). The proportion of home-
owners  is traditionally less significant in an urban environment than in 
rural areas, but the quantitative differential for deductions is also ex-
plained by the high purchase price (which is  growing rapidly, as we 
have seen) of housing in Brussels,25 combined with the limited income 
of a large part of the population.26 
3.2. Establish more degression
46. Another series  of proposals should be mentioned in order to 
broaden the analysis. What if the regional authorities  made the tax 
credit degressive (in time)? The financial effort is  the greatest at the be-
ginning of a mortgage repayment for at least two reasons. Provided 
that the person concerned borrowed at a fixed rate (which is  the case 
the vast majority of times)  and kept his  or her job, the monthly burden – 
which is invariable – decreases over the duration, in relative terms, 
since the person's  income inevitably increases  according to the health 
index, even if the person concerned does  not receive a salary increase. 
The second reason is  that statistics  show that people's  professional 
9
23 31.9% at the end of 2012. Not everyone benefits necessarily from the housing bonus, since their dwelling is perhaps not their ‘own and sole’.
24  The relative weakness of this percentage should not be surprising: very many households have already finished repaying their mortgage loan, or have inherited their home (when they 
have not purchased it entirely with their own money, which happens more rarely).
25 In 2012, the average price of flats was 218,000 euros in Brussels, compared to 207,000 euros in Flanders and 162,000 euros in Wallonia. The rift is widening with respect to houses in 
Brussels, where the average price is 354,000 euros; the price of houses has stagnated in Flanders (207,000 euros) and is even lower in Wallonia (147,000 euros), due to the simple fact 
that this type of housing is found more in a rural setting, which is less expensive (whereas flats are found mainly in urban areas, which are more expensive). 
26 The average income per inhabitant reaches 17,146 euros in Flanders, 15,277 euros in Wallonia and only 12,885 euros in Brussels. Source : SPF Economie, Statistique fiscale des reve-
nus. 
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situation generally improves  with time (promotion, change of work, 
etc.), so that households have more financial means  in mid-career than 
at the beginning. 
47. For these reasons, we feel that the amount of the future bonus 
should be significantly greater at the beginning of the loan repayment 
than at the end, with an annual decrease, for example. There is  a  simi-
lar system today (with the abolishment of the increase of 750 euros  
after the tenth tax period), but a more linear and more gradual ap-
proach would be better. Or in a  more abrupt manner, the application of 
the bonus  could be limited in time (the first ten years of the loan for ex-
ample, and not after that).
48. Implicitly, the focus  should be on home ownership as a priority, 
and perhaps less on its maintenance. Besides, the rate of defaulting 
homeowners (who are unable to make their monthly mortgage pay-
ments  and are therefore subject to foreclosure) is relatively low27  with 
respect to the overall number of people who have taken out a mort-
gage loan in Belgium. Furthermore, the regional entities already ensure 
a protection against non payments  by offering borrowers free insurance 
against the loss of income.28  In any case, this is one of the ways in 
which the housing bonus will be socialised somewhat. 
3.3. Transform the deduction into allowance
49. A last proposal may be made: in order to provide preferential aid 
to young households, it would be worthwhile to transform the tax de-
duction (whose positive effects  are delayed, as  mentioned above) into a 
sort of investment allowance which could be available immediately. This 
would benefit greatly those with limited resources  who are not able to 
wait two years  to receive the aid, and who do not have the means to 
become homeowners  without it. This  road has not been taken. Not to 
mention that the poorest people do not pay tax anyway, which makes 
the deduction of interest 'of no interest'. 
50. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that this solution, which 
amounts  to transforming a tax advantage spread over several years 
into direct aid in the form of a  lump sum, would require the public 
authorities to mobilise a considerable amount of money all at once. 
3.4. A principle of budgetary reality
51. That being so, and despite the aptness  of these suggestions, a 
principle of budgetary reality may rapidly emerge. As  mentioned above, 
the funds  which accompany this  transfer of competence may not be 
sufficient, in as  much as these means  must be used to assist new buy-
ers as well as  ensure the continuation of deductions  pertaining to exist-
ing loans. If need be, the amount of the tax bonus should perhaps be 
reduced, for past buyers  as  well (notwithstanding the opinions  of policy 
makers). 
52. However, the new executive of the Brussels Region proudly as-
serts  that ‘the government will provide more support for home owner-
ship’, and sets  the tone for the future housing bonus: ‘At the very least, 
the existing tax incentives  will be maintained, and as  far as  possible 
rendered more flexible and even broadened  […] Furthermore, the 
"housing loan" tax deductibility will be maintained and evaluated in the 
framework of the (global)  tax reform, which will be implemented in 
2017’.29 It is impossible to know if  the broadening in question will con-
cern the target public or the amount of financial aid itself.
53. Already, without an additional budget, it is  unrealistic to believe 
that the previous  regime could be prolonged without any changes. 
10
27 8,000 [P. De Decker and V. Geurts, 2004].
28 Voy. in particular art. 112, §2, of the Brussels Housing Code (the implementation decree is still pending). In Wallonia, the free insurance against the loss of income covers for three years, 
for the amount of 6,200 euros per year, the default in the repayment of a mortgage due directly to the loss of employment or work incapacity (decree of the Walloon Government of 21 
January 1999 establishing insurance against the loss of income due to the loss of employment or work incapacity, M.B., 25 February 1999).
29 Agreement of the majority 2014/2019, p. 95.
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Then what of the announcements to extend the system? But politics  is 
never only about priorities. At the very least, it will not be easy for Brus-
sels  to reconcile this  universalist ambition with another more social ob-
jective, announced publicly: ‘With respect to low- or average-income 
families, the purchase of their first dwelling will be more advantageous 
from a tax perspective.’30 The squaring of the circle is not far off. 
54. As a  backdrop to their reflections, the authorities must not lose 
sight of the fact that an excessive promotion of home ownership (in this 
case through tax incentives) always  carries risks, of which there are at 
least three: the intensification of urban sprawl involving the middle class 
from the Brussels Region (as seen in recent decades), the rise in pur-
chase prices (triggered by an increase in/stimulation of the demand,  as 
seen in Flanders  a few years  ago when registration fees  decreased 
from 12.5% to 10%) and, finally, the increase in the household debt. A 
cautious approach is therefore warranted.
55. We are well aware that housing-related tax represents  a whole, 
with a complex structure, whose elements are closely interdependent; 
making changes to one of the elements  without introducing compensa-
tions  with respect to the others could upset the overall balance. In this 
matter, it is therefore necessary to avoid any unilateralism.
56. Nevertheless, these arguments would not prevent a calm and ob-
jective discussion on the housing-related tax, without bias or doctrinaire 
obstinacy. To refuse the very principle of this  discussion could be seen 
as a corporatist withdrawal. 
Conclusion
57. The housing bonus, as  mentioned above, is  characterised by a 
lack of equity and effectiveness, among others. It is  up to the Regions 
to take the opportunity represented by the sixth state reform to recon-
figure it, in order for it to better meet the general objectives  of their 
housing policies. It has meant that, by increasing the advantages (tax-
related, but not only) for homeowners, the final purpose of the tax (as 
well as that of the deductions/reductions  system) has  perhaps  been 
forgotten: to ensure the redistribution of wealth in the fairest possible 
way, and not to encourage by all accounts  (and somewhat blindly) one 
lifestyle rather than another. It may be judicious in this respect to bear in 
mind that the housing bonus  is  not supposed to represent direct aid for 
home ownership or an independent system; it constitutes no more than 
a modalisation of personal income tax through deduction/reduction. 
58. At the same time, a  Region such as  Brussels  must ensure that its 
housing market maintains  a  certain vitality, as more than 40%31 of its 
own tax revenue comes from registration fees (this tax revenue then 
represents 39% of the Region's  finances32). In this  respect, a sudden 
drop in the number of transactions, perhaps  triggered by overly radical 
announcements, might cut into the Region's  tax base significantly and, 
subsequently, affect its  capacity to address  the challenges which it 
must face today, such as population growth for the most part.
59. The road is undoubtedly narrow between these two points. But 
constraint generates creativity, in politics as well as in other areas.
11
30 Part 2 of the Annexe à l’Exposé général du Budget des recettes et des dépenses de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale pour l’année budgétaire 2015, Doc., Parl. Rég. Brux.-Cap., sess. 
ord. 2014-2015, n°A-51/2, p. 114.
31 503 million euros, of a taxation total of 1.245 billion (Budget des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014, Doc. parl., Rég. Brux.-Cap., sess. ord. 2013-2014, n°A-463-1, 
p. 142).
32 Ibidem, p. 142. 
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